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We offer a model that sheds light on the debate over whether corporate 
ownership concentration converges to the Berle-Means image that is diffuse in 
stock ownership concentration. Our model takes into account the importance 
of both legal rules and firm-specific arrangements. Our analytical result is that 
share ownership concentration either persists or falls depending on the relative 
importance of these protective arrangements. Our model predicts: (a) diffuse 
share ownership in nations that impose legal limits on blockholders’ clout to 
expropriate minority shareholder rights, and (b) concentrated share ownership 
in nations that rely on asset specificity as a form of investor protection.  
An empirical examination of the data shows that the level of corporate 
ownership concentration has persisted over the period from 1994 to 2003. But 
this result does not preclude the possibility of ‘functional convergence’ – 
convergence to the diffuse form of share ownership through cross-listings on 
U.S. stock exchanges that impose both stringent disclosure and listing 
requirements to dampen share ownership concentration. These results suggest a 
case for the co-existence of the preexisting path-dependency and functional-
convergence stories.  
Some skeptics question the relevance of this debate. This attack rests on a 
couple of dimensions. The first dimension concerns the fact that states – 
unlike producers in a competitive market – may not operate as price takers. 
States can often use their de facto authority to set the legal terrain on which 
competition takes place (Greenwood, 2005). If most states aim to receive more 
corporate tax revenue1, these states can choose to ‘go nuclear’, for instance, by 
subsidizing local companies, to retain control of the existing onshore 
                                                 
1 Several accounts frame the debate over the race to the top or the bottom. For instance, Cary 
(1974) outlines the race to the bottom in corporate law, and Winter (1977) describes the race to the 
top in corporate law. Recent discussions seem to have revived the ‘race’ debate. Bebchuk (1992) 
suggests that state competition may lead to the adoption of undesirable corporate legal rules. This 
legal change is likely to lead to a race to the bottom in the presence of managerial opportunism and 
externalities. But several factors could inadvertently result in the failure of state competition. 
Romano (1993) discusses the event studies in support of the view that the U.S. corporate law 
regime is not a product of state competition. Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2002) suggest that the 
empirical results do not support the case for state competition. Further, Bebchuk and Hamdani 
(2002) argue a case for some form of federal intervention to empower shareholders to initiate and 
approve re-incorporations. It is important to note that we use the phrases, ‘the race to the top’ and 
‘the race to the bottom’, as the race for all market participants to improve or downgrade the existing 
body of corporate law rules and securities regulations. These participants encompass companies, 
executives, directors, shareholders, and regulators. The recent discussions on the race debate 
suggest that state competition may not be the key determinant of rules governing corporate matters. 
Our treatment entails a more holistic view; we focus on whether cross-listings facilitate the race to 
the top from a global perspective. In contrast, the discussions as cited above focus on the effect of 
state competition (in the U.S.) on the quality of governance.  
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arrangements that may not be optimal. Hence, states may have the power to 
create legal hurdles to deter such convergence. In this light, convergence 
towards any one-size-fits-all solution may not be plausible because bureaucrats 
who politicize corporate law prevent self-regulation to emerge. Political debate 
poses social costs and in turn may render the convergence process inefficient. 
By this line of reasoning the convergence debate that we explore in this study is 
neither a race to the top nor a race to the bottom. In this rather pessimistic 
view, the convergence story is not inevitable and so lacks policy implications.  
We accept the view that states can exert influence over the legal conditions for 
corporate power-sharing and ownership schemes. But this view overlooks one of 
the key roles of government: to build a sustainable, facilitative legal system that 
allows market competition to take place. Today’s global economy is a double-
tiered market. The first tier consists of companies with international reach. In 
contrast, the second tier comprises companies that concentrate their regional 
exposures. Even in the case where states operate to attract corporate taxes, it is 
possible to design a double-tiered legal framework as a response. Companies that 
concentrate on-shore exposures adhere to the rules and norms in a given 
country. For companies that operate across countries, compliance with a set of 
strict governance standards signals better quality. As a result, an improvement in 
the quality of governance promotes better outcomes. Over the long run, states 
and investors benefit from the success of these companies because they generate 
larger corporate tax revenue and tend to have a propensity to emulate the most 
effective and efficient ownership structures. In essence, state control should not 
totally preclude the case for (partial) convergence. 
A second potential source of skepticism relates to the patterns of share 
ownership concentration around the world. Recent studies show that common-
law regimes appear to outperform civil-law regimes in shaping an environment in 
which securities markets can prosper (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998, 1999, 2002; 
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998:2134). Common-law countries have an 
average ratio of publicly traded shares to Gross National Product of 0.60, but the 
same ratio is only 0.21 for French civil-law countries and 0.45 for German civil-
law countries. The U.K. has 36 listed firms per million citizens and the U.S. has 
30, but France, Germany and Italy have only 8, 4, and 5 respectively. Hence, law 
does matter. If the U.S., the U.K., Japan and some other countries with Berle-
Means listed companies represent most of the value of the global stock market, 
why is it relevant to examine the patterns of ownership concentration in the 
other countries? In order to overcome this objection and to better understand 
the underlying trends, we look at cross-country share ownership patterns, and 
more generally, the evolution of corporate power-sharing schemes. This focus 
could allow us to explain why differences in ownership concentration and 
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governance may or may not persist. More importantly this paper explains why 
share ownership concentration could affect the tilt of corporate power and thus 
the quality of governance as well as why certain governance practices help 
enhance outcomes.  
The remainder of the paper has the following structure. Section 1 briefly 
frames the debate over whether the form of share ownership becomes diffuse 
over time. Section 2 presents a model that nests legal and firm-specific 
protections in the function of ownership concentration. This model 
synthesizes the path-dependence and convergence stories and thus serves as a 
basis for the subsequent empirical tests. Section 3 describes the data and 
discusses the empirical results. Section 4 concludes this paper.  
1. THE CONVERGENCE DEBATE  
1.1.  THE NEOCLASSICAL CONVERGENCE HYPOTHESIS  
In the neoclassical view, the Berle-Means form of the modern corporation has 
survived to date as this form of corporate ownership and governance best 
balances the costs of managerial control, risk-sharing, and capital needs. In a 
Darwinian evolution, the corporation is expected to mitigate agency problems 
with a board of directors, by use of debt, and with incentive-based pay schemes. 
Further, the joint threat of proxy contests, takeovers, and social norms can 
discipline corporate managers. In turn the modern corporation adapts to these 
competitive forces via fractional share ownership.  
1.1.1. The Rise of Fractional Corporate Ownership  
The market-oriented model creates a positive externality to investors and 
companies. Companies can be viewed as a ‘nexus of contracts’ (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986). Investors who spread their shareholdings across a 
number of firms reap risk-sharing benefits. Because investors provide capital to 
companies and grant monitoring power to directors, insofar as there are sound 
legal institutions that effectively protect minority shareholder rights, investors’ 
key role is to offer liquidity to companies. By holding small shares, investors 
put funds into more firms and in turn benefit from diversification (Coffee, 
1991:1284-1290, 1999, 2002; Maug, 1998). Hence, investors can choose to forego 
their direct control over management in order to retain the option to liquid-
date diffuse shares in due course (Coffee, 2001:2-4).  
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1.1.2. Globalization and Systemic Adaptability  
The increasing globalization of capital markets is widely viewed as another 
competitive force that drives convergence towards the Berle-Means image of the 
modern company. Multinational firms can opt into better regulatory regimes. The 
U.S. and U.K. securities markets are examples of such regimes that help enhance 
fiduciary protection of minority shareholder rights (Cunningham, 1999:1143-1146; 
Coffee, 1999, 2002). Deep and liquid stock markets that emphasize investor 
interests facilitate quick responses in times of stress. These strong market forces 
then serve as an external monitor. Examples of such an external monitor include 
(a) market analysts whose buy and/or sell recommendations can have a first-order 
effect on share prices, and (b) cross-border mergers and acquisitions that can 
involve an influx of new shareholders (Gordon, 1999:219-220).  
1.1.3. International Emulation 
Anglo-American corporate systems take the lead in shaping liquid markets and 
diffuse share ownership. This approach to corporate governance has been 
confrontational, relying on competition and division of responsibility to drive 
performance (Coffee, 1991:1280-1281, 1284-1290; Kissane, 1997:626-633). As a 
result, self-regulatory forces can arise from a desire to emulate a set of best 
practices in corporate governance. Many international organizations have been 
closely involved in the development of general principles of corporate 
governance. These efforts contribute to the prevalence of the theme that 
adherence to the shareholder-market model lead to better corporate outcomes 
(Hansmann and Kraakman, 2004). Evidence in support of the above assertion is 
that many Anglo-American companies have performed better as compared to 
both the principal East Asian and continental European companies, most of 
which deviate from the share-holder-market model (La Porta et al, 1999:480-491; 
Claessens et al., 2000:82-84, 94-99; Ayyagari, 2005).  
1.2.  THE PATH DEPENDENCE STORY  
Unlike proponents of the convergence story, others suggest a number of barriers 
to convergence toward the Berle-Means firm that is diffuse in stock ownership. 
Below we briefly discuss reasons why concentrated share ownership could persist 
over time. Our main goal is to explore the roots of the persistence of share 
ownership concentration. The potential reasons include politics, rent-protection 
behaviors, complementarities, sunk costs, and social norms of trust. 
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1.2.1. The Political Theory of Corporate Finance 
Some scholars contend that politics confines the terrain on which the large 
enterprise may evolve (Roe, 1991:11-13, 2000). This confinement subsequently 
shapes the efficient form of ownership to which the modern enterprise adapts. 
Also this confinement gives rise to specific power-sharing arrangements. For 
instance, U.S. populism leads to the common belief that no institution should 
have significant financial power (Roe, 1991:31-32; Lipset and Schneider, 1987:5-6; 
Acemoglu et al., 2001:1369-1370). The U.S. general public’s mistrust of financial 
power could be viewed as an unequivocal case for laws that limit financial 
institutions’ ownership of listed shares (Black, 1990; Coffee, 1991, 1999; Roe, 
1991). In contrast, Germany and Japan lack the U.S.-style populism and operate 
a bank-oriented model. Most German and Japanese listed corporations tend to 
centralize decisions and rely on banks or other financial intermediaries for 
funding investment plans (Roe, 1993:1933-1936, 1994). Such examples show that 
politics sets the limits of financial institutions’ reach in share ownership. In 
turn, these limits impart the main conditions for the separation of ownership 
and control in the corporate context.  
1.2.2. The Rent-Protection Theory of Corporate Ownership and Control 
Some scholars suggest that leaving corporate control up for grabs may attract 
attempts to acquire the company by rivals who seek to capture private benefits 
of control 2  (Bebchuk, 1999; Benos and Weisbach, 2004). Concentrated equity 
blocks are likely to prevail in countries where private benefits of control are 
large. Such countries, for instance, as Italy and Brazil, appear to lack legal 
institutions that deter rent protection. In contrast, concentrated share 
ownership is likely to wane in countries that have robust legal rules in place to 
curtail private benefits of control.  
If private benefits of control are large, corporate insiders usually face incentives 
not to subject the company to stringent disclosure and other listing rules. Doidge 
(2002, 2004), Doidge et al. (2005), and Benos and Weisbach (2004:234-238) find that 
private benefits of control tend to be larger in companies not crosslisting their 
shares abroad. East Asian companies that use pyramid structures, dual-class 
shares, and overseas crossholdings to enhance shareholders’ grip of corporate 
control are another example of rent protection. Bebchuk et al. (1999) and La Porta 
et al. (1999) provide a detailed account of these arrangements.  
                                                 
2 Private benefits of control are often referred to as ‘benefits that accrue to managers or [block-
holders] that have control of the corporation but not to minority shareholders’. Examples are 
business connections, large office suites, , managers’ retreat, and other perquisites.  
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1.2.3. A Nexus of ‘Firm-Specific Investments,’ Not a Nexus of ‘Contracts’ 
Some scholars reject the view that a company is a nexus of contracts. These 
scholars argue that a company could instead be viewed as a ‘nexus of firm-
specific investments’ (Blair and Stout, 1999:275). Each team member devotes 
specialized, irrevocable efforts to the corporation. Employees carry out day-to-
day operational tasks. Senior executives organize and oversee staff 
performance. Creditors and stock owners inject funds to support the firm’s 
investment projects. The board of directors acts as a mediating hierarchy that 
integrates these efforts (Rajan and Zingales, 1998). A team member’s efforts are 
‘specific’ to the firm. In addition, each team member’s investment has little or 
no value outside the joint enterprise. Also, no one can leave the enterprise and 
realize the value of the investment in full.  
The status quo generally serves as one of multiple optima. If high switching 
costs are required to shift to an alternative optimum, continuance is often 
efficient (Bebchuk and Roe, 1999:139-142). A change in share ownership 
dispersion could result in inconsistencies between the new structure and the 
other elements of team production. Often times, the existing ownership and 
governance patterns are only second-best options. A good example can be 
Russian investors’ preference for direct government control of large enterprises. 
In this case official intervention serves as an alter-native form of investor 
protection. If a shift to first-best structures (say, less government control) 
requires large switching costs and in turn leads to third-best outcomes, it may 
be best to maintain the status quo. Hence, complementary corporate structures 
are expected to persist over time.  
1.2.4. Social Norms of Fairness and Trust 
An extant literature suggests that social norms – such as fairness and trust – help 
shape the trajectory on which corporate structures evolve (Blair and Stout, 
2001:1807-1810; Licht, 2001; Coffee, 2001). In the corporate context, the rules of the 
game often depend on what is perceived to be fair. Stakeholders see a mix of 
corporate power as unfair if this mix departs substantially from the terms of a 
reference transaction, which is a transaction setting the benchmark for some 
corporate interactions (Jolls et al., 1998:1493-1497). Due to cultural differences, the 
reference transaction may vary from country to country. For instance, American 
culture generally resists hierarchy and centralized authority more than French 
culture (Bebchuk and Roe, 1999:168-169). In Germany, codetermination reflects the 
need for a fair go for all employees (Roe, 1993:1942-1943). In East Asian ‘dragon’ 
economies, many large enterprises bribe government officials to seek protection 
(Claessens et al., 2000:83). Most Italian firms view family involvement as an 
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indispensable value driver. If these cultural differences persist, corporate 
structures are most likely to remain close to their initial conditions.  
1.3.  A CAUTIONARY NOTE  
We have framed the convergence debate. Proponents of both path-
dependence and convergence stories seem to hold rather firm views on the 
evolution of corporate ownership dispersion. In an intuitive sense, the main 
forces that render corporate structures persistent may deter convergence 
towards the Berle-Means corporation. In particular, the path-dependence story 
suggests that the level of ownership concentration at any point in time depends 
on the initial condition. This static relation, however, may not constitute the 
full picture. In contrast, the convergence theory better describes the more 
dynamic part of the picture: cross-listings on U.S. stock exchanges allow non-
U.S. firms to bond themselves to higher standards of corporate governance 
and in turn facilitate convergence toward diffuse share ownership. It is thereby 
reasonable to integrate the competing stories to paint a more complete picture.  
In Section 2, we present a model that captures both the static and dynamic 
components of share ownership concentration. Our analysis helps detect the 
conditions for Berle-Means convergence. In particular, the model demonstrates 
that the degree of share ownership concentration could be decomposed into a) 
the initial condition, and b) the relative importance of legal and firm-specific 
protective mechanisms. This analysis motivates our empirical tests in Section 3.  
2.  A UNIFIED THEORY  
2.1.  SOME BACKGROUND 
We derive a model to characterize the relationship between legal protection of 
investor rights and firm-specific provisions that help insulate minority 
shareholders, namely, inside share ownership concentration and asset 
endowment. Insiders can often commit to lower rates of value diversion by 
holding a large fraction of equity in the company (Himmelberg et al., 2002). In this 
case, share ownership entails an inexorable tradeoff between bonding incentives 
and risk-sharing benefits for insiders. How these insiders balance the tradeoff in 
turn determines the severity of agency costs. Legal rules that protect investor 
rights to corporate securities could well tilt this trade-off in favor of more diffuse 
share ownership. This conjecture arises from the fact that strong legal protection 
of investor rights enhances the value of equity in the large enterprise (La Porta et 
al., 1999, 2002). As a consequence, investor-friendly legal remedies could at least 
partly affect the equilibrium level of share ownership dispersion.  
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Asset endowment also plays a role in setting the equilibrium level of share 
ownership dispersion. 3  Highly specific assets, such as research labs, plant, 
property and equipment, and factories, require large sums of finance and are 
thus hard to steal. This idea relates to Blair and Stout’s (1999) team production 
story. Each stakeholder’s contribution to the corporate team complements the 
use of assets that are ‘specific’ to the company. Therefore stakeholders that 
leave the enterprise lose the additional value arising from the positive interplay 
between their human capital and asset use. In that light, highly specific assets 
provide a built-in degree of investor protection. On the contrary, assets such as 
technical know-how and on-the-job experience are easier to expropriate if 
insiders can readily leave to start their own ventures at a low cost (Himmelberg 
et al., 2002). Therefore, a lack of asset specificity may render investors more 
vulnerable to value diversion by insiders (Bebchuk and Jolls, 1999). In essence, 
asset specificity is at least as important as rules of law in approximating the 
degree of full investor protection.  
Our model relates to a number of studies that shed light on the link between 
corporate structures and firm-specific asset endowments. In particular, highly 
specific assets lead to opportunities for private benefits of control. Corporate 
insiders’ attempts to confiscate these private benefits lock in large blocks of 
stock. These attempts propagate information asymmetries arising from the fact 
that managers know more about the value of company assets than 
shareholders. As a result, such information asymmetries lead the company to 
choose share ownership and governance schemes that provide a suboptimal 
degree of investor protection (Bebchuk, 2002). Recent studies suggest that there 
are marked differences in share ownership and governance structures around 
the world (La Porta et al., 1998, 1999). While many economists suggest that the 
forces of globalization put ineluctable pressures on corporate structures to 
converge towards the most efficient genre (Easterbrook and Fischel, 1991:212-
213), others argue that rent-protection behaviors could result in the persistence 
of corporate structures (Bebchuk and Roe, 1999).  
The subsequent derivation of our model builds on the discussions above. The 
prevailing level of inside share ownership concentration at any point in time 
can be expressed as a function of a) the initial level of share ownership 
concentration, b) ‘asset protection’ of investor rights, and c) ‘legal protection’ 
that inhibits shareholder value diversion. Given the relative weights assigned to 
                                                 
3 Specific assets are referred to as assets for which it is hard to find substitutes. A good example 
can be 100 percent humanization mouse technology used in various biotech experiments. This 
particular kind of mouse technology differs from the 80-90 percent humanization alternatives in 
its robustness in many drug experiments.  
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both asset and legal protections, our model predicts whether corporate 
ownership structures converge over time.  
2.2.  MODEL SETUP AND DERIVATION 
Our proposed model builds upon a schematic Cobb-Douglas process that 
converts inputs factors into one single output variable. The Cobb-Douglas 
process is a standard concept that helps build the microeconomic foundation for 
our model of corporate ownership concentration. The Cobb-Douglas process 
also helps simplify the derivation of the model. We refer the input factors to the 
quality of both legal and asset protections of shareholder rights. In addition, we 
define the output variable as the full degree of investor protection. The underlying 
intuition is to convert legal and asset protections into a common unit of output 
that captures the full benefits of investor protection arising from the legal and 
asset arrangements. Table 1 provides the variable definitions below: 
 
Table 1:  Variable definitions and mathematical notations 
Notation Definition 
F0(t) 
the full degree of investor protection arising from both legal and 
firm-specific arrangements that protect investor rights at time t 
f0(t) 
the degree of asset protection of investor rights arising from 
different levels of asset specificity at time t 
x0(t) 
the degree of investor protection arising from legal remedies that 
govern corporate activities at time t 
α The factor share that reflects the relative importance of asset protection of investor rights (f0(t)) 
β the factor share that reflects the relative importance of legal protection of investor rights (x0(t)) 
φ0 the initial level of inside share ownership concentration 
φ(t) the current level of inside share ownership concentration at time t 
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Our proposed Cobb-Douglas process can be expressed as the following: 
(1) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )βα= txtftx,tfF 00000  
Taking the natural log of each side of Eq.(1) yields a linear equation: 
(2) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )txtftx,tfF β+α=  
where F=lnF0, f=lnf0, and x=lnx0 are the log-transformed counterparts of the 
full, asset, and legal protections respectively. In Eq.(2) the factor shares, α and β, 
reflect the relative importance of the asset and legal conditions under which the 
economy operates. For instance, the U.S., Britain, and other Anglo-Saxon 
countries emphasize legal protection of shareholder rights. So these countries 
could be viewed as economies where α is smaller than β. In other words, these 
countries attach a larger weight to legal protection than to asset protection. In 
contrast, investors in countries such as Germany, Japan, and the so-called ‘social 
democracies’ in Continental Europe, rely upon asset protection of investor 
rights. Such countries could be viewed as economies where α is larger than β. 
Also, we assume that insiders benefit from positive stock ownership of the 
company (0<φ<1). We scale this term by F/f, or (αf+βx)/f, to measure the full 
degree of investor protection. Hence, the expression, [φ·(αf+βx)/f], captures the 
full benefits of asset and legal protective arrangements arising from 100 percent 
inside share ownership. We scale this expression to capture the benefits of legal 
and asset protections arising from any partial stock ownership: [φ·(αf+βx)/f]·dφ 
where dφ denotes a marginal change in share ownership. 
Because diffuse ownership spreads the benefits of legal and asset protections 
to more owners, an economy’s dispersion of share ownership creates a 
network externality to corporations. Investor protection hence goes hand in 
hand with share ownership concentration at the margin. We note that this 
assumption does not imply La Porta et al.’s evidence of a negative relationship 
between ownership concentration and legal protection of investor rights. 
Rather, this assumption suggests that a marginal change in full protection, dF, 
can be expressed as a function of a marginal change in the full benefits of both 
legal and asset protections arising from ‘partial’ inside stock ownership as 
discussed above. In this case, dF and dφ move in opposite directions due to the 
spread effect of share ownership dispersion. 
We assume that changes in the degree of full investor protection arising from 
either legal or asset protections are proportional to changes in the full benefits 
of legal and asset protections arising from partial inside share ownership of a 
given corporation.  
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(3)   ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )txdtf
txtftx
k
1tf,tfdF φ⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛ β+αφ−=  
where k>0 is a proportionality scalar, and the negative sign on the right-hand 
side of Eq.(3) keeps intact the assumption that diffuse share ownership permits 
the full benefits of investor protection to spread to more owners. 
We assume that the level of inside share ownership concentration depends on 
the degree of legal protection at any point in time. The reader might note that 
this characterization does not capture the protective effect of asset specificity. In 
other words, why is φ(x(t)) a function of x(t) only but not a function of both f(t) 
and x(t)? Our response to this question is twofold. First, the empirics support 
our characterization. We could view the level of inside share ownership 
concentration as a response to the degree of legal protection. As will be shown 
below, the solution to Eq.(3) sheds light on the nature of association between 
φ(x(t)) and x(t). Second, we view the value of property rights as the value of legal 
rules that enforce these property rights, not the value of the underlying assets. 
Specific assets only have a good value if there are laws that protect the use of 
these assets. Examples of such laws include land laws and patent laws. Strong 
and robust legal institutions that protect rights to shares create incentives for 
investors to invest in publicly listed companies. This line of reasoning suggests 
that legal protection acts as the precondition for holding diffuse shares. 
Rearranging Eq.(3) with the substitution of dF/dφ=(dF/dx)(dx/dφ)= βdx/dφ 
yields Eq.(4): 
(4)  ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )tdxtxtf
tfktxdtx ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
β+α
β−=φφ   
Next, we integrate both sides of Eq. (4) to solve for φ(x(t)):  
(5)  ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )txtflntkf2ctx β+α−=φ  
where c is an arbitrary constant. As φ(x(t)) is strictly positive by definition, 
Eq.(5) should hold for plausible values of k, α, and β. Let the initial condition 
be φ(x(0))= φ(0)= φ0. We then obtain c= φ02 + 2kf(t) ln(αf(t)). Substituting this 
result into Eq.(5) yields the following: 
(6)  ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛
β+α
α+φ=φ φ=φ=φ txtf
tflntkf2tx 20 (0) (x(0)) 0   
528 / REVIEW OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 3:2, 2007
Review of Law & Economics, © 2007 by bepress
 
We define the ‘convergence determinant’, θ(f(t),x(t)), as the following: 
(7)  ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎜⎝
⎛
β+α
α=θ
txtf
tflntkf2tx,tf  
Then we can simplify Eq.(6) to Eq.(8) below: 
(8)  ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )tx,tftx 20 (0) (x(0)) 0 θ+φ=φ φ=φ=φ  
The convergence determinant, θ(f(t),x(t)), sets the preconditions for stock 
ownership to converge to the Berle-Means form. If θ turns out to be 
substantially close to nil, φ(x(t)) remains close to φ0 or stays path dependent 
over time. If θ is consistently negative over time, φ(x(t)) converges to nil 
because φ(x(t)) is bounded below by zero by definition. Also Eq.(6) shows that 
the level of inside stock ownership for a given degree of total investor 
protection at time t, φ(x(t)), is either equal to or less than the initial level of 
inside share ownership concentration, φ0, since the term inside the natural log 
cannot be greater than unity.  
2.3.  DISCUSSIONS 
Eq. (6) suggests a couple of propositions. Firstly, the optimal level of 
ownership concentration is negatively related to the degree of legal protection 
of investor rights (ceteris paribus). Our model finds that this relationship is 
nonlinear. But this analytical result accords with the law-and-finance thesis: 
“ownership concentration serves as a substitute for poor investor protection” 
(La Porta et al., 1999:473-474, 497). Further, we note that Eq.(6) does not imply 
the same sort of association between share ownership concentration, φ(x(t)), 
and asset protection, f(t). Our analytical solution implies that there is an 
ambiguous relationship between share ownership concentration and asset 
protection. Endowed assets could be viewed as a natural product of the 
geographic environment in the era of colonial settlement and/or extraction. It 
is therefore reasonable to suggest that most firm-specific protections are 
exogenous due to historical contingencies such as colonization (Acemoglu et al., 
2001). In essence, the effect of asset protection on share ownership 
concentration is not clear-cut.  
Secondly, Eq.(6) supports the case for the path-dependence of share 
ownership concentration: “a country’s pattern of corporate ownership 
structures at any point in time depends partly on the patterns it had at earlier 
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times” (Bebchuk and Roe, 1999:129). This prediction sheds light on the 
company’s share ownership concentration that could persist due to a number 
of factors such as network externalities, institutional complementarities, sunk 
adaptive costs, and multiple optima for corporate ownership and governance 
structures. In addition to these forces, rent-seeking behaviors accentuate the 
persistence of corporate structures (Bebchuk, 1999:14-17). The parties who 
intervene in corporate decisions under an existing structure might have both 
the incentive and power to hinder changes that would otherwise be socially 
efficient. Thus, the persistence of ownership and governance structures could 
be a natural outcome due to interest groups’ attempts to retain their private 
benefits of corporate control.  
We now discuss how a change in the relative weights, α and β, affects the 
property of ownership concentration. Consider a recent social democracy, for 
instance, Russia, in which cultural norms and political backlashes emphasize 
asset protection more than legal protection. In this case, α is larger than β, 
rendering θ close to zero. Given the initial condition φ0, φ(x(t)) is likely to 
persist at φ0 or the initial level of share ownership concentration. In other 
words concentrated ownership is likely to persist in social democracies where 
asset endowments are viewed as more important than legal remedies.  
Now consider the Berle-Means corporation in which diffuse share ownership 
reflects sound legal protection of investor rights. This observation arises from a 
variety of reasons, such as relentless political backlashes, social norms of trust, 
and legal impediments that block financial institutions’ control over 
corporations. In this case, α is smaller than β. Given any initial condition φ0, 
φ(x(t)) is likely to converge to an insignificant size over time, ceteris paribus. 
We arrive at this result as a) φ(x(t)) is bounded below by zero, and b) θ(f(t),x(t)) 
is consistently negative and so drives φ(x(t)) to a relatively trivial term. Hence, it 
is likely for share ownership to become more and more diffuse in economies 
that emphasize legal protection of investor rights.  
In Section 3, we explore whether convergence towards diffuse share 
ownership occurs in practice. Section 3 presents the data, describes the 
variables, and then discusses the results. Also, Section 3 provides robustness 
checks on the results. At the end of Section 3 we provide a brief summary of 
the key findings arising from this empirical work. 
3. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
We test for the presence or absence of convergence toward diffuse share 
ownership. Our starting point is a simple OLS regression of the functional 
form: ln(φ(t)/φ0)=f(lnφ0, XLs, relevant control variables) where φ(t) is the 
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current level of inside ownership concentration, φ0 is the initial level of inside 
ownership concentration, and XLs is the proxy for the effect of cross-listings 
on U.S. stock exchanges. If the coefficient on lnφ0 is significantly negative, the 
distance between the initial (high) and current levels of share ownership 
concentration shrinks over the sample period. In this case, corporate 
ownership converges toward the Berle-Means image. Alternatively, if the 
coefficient on lnφ0 is not far from zero, cross-country differences in share 
ownership concentration persist over time.  
Similarly, the statistical significance of XLs lends credence to the case for 
functional convergence toward diffuse ownership due to the legal 
consequences of cross-listings on U.S. stock exchanges. In this case, companies 
that operate in countries with lax ownership limits are said to converge to the 
Berle-Means image via their cross-listings in the U.S. Also, we add a number of 
variables that reflect each country’s characteristics in terms of governance, legal 
origin, political orientation, and colonial endowment. The inclusion of control 
variables permits us to carry out robustness checks on the empirical results.  
3.1.  DATA 
We collect data from a number of sources. The proxies for share ownership 
concentration come from Thomson Financials’ Worldscope database. These 
factors correspond to closely held shares recorded on Worldscope. Worldscope 
defines closely held shares in percentage terms to include the shares held by 
insiders such as directors, officers, and immediate family, those shares held in 
trust, by any institutional investor such as other corporations, pension funds, 
or benefit plans, as well as those shares held by individuals who own 5 percent 
or more of all outstanding shares. We measure the company’s prevailing level 
of share ownership concentration as the percentage of closely held shares at 
the end of 2003. Also, we measure the company’s initial level of ownership 
concentration as the percentage of closely held shares at the end of a year 
during the period from 1994 to 1999. This year provides the greatest number 
of companies over the 5-year period. This measurement allows us to acquire a 
sufficient number of countries for this empirical work. Table 2 reports the 
number of companies in each of the 46 countries that we include in the 
sample. As a last step, we take the average of share ownership concentration 
percentages for all companies in a country and then use this average as the 
typical level of share ownership concentration for that country.  
In addition to the share ownership data, we use country-level factors to 
capture the differences in the wider legal, governance, and geopolitical 
environment. We use the World Bank’s governance data, “Governance Matters 
III”, to describe the quality of governance in each sample country. In brief 
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terms, this database sheds light on the key aspects of each sample country’s 
wide framework of governance such as voice and accountability, political 
stability, absence of violence, govern-ment effectiveness, quality of regulation, 
rule of law and control of corruption (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 2003).  
 
Table 2:  Number of companies in each of the 46 sample countries 
Country Name Year 1994~1999 Year 2003 
Australia 70 524 
Austria 11 33 
Belgium 48 60 
Brazil 34 36 
Canada 53 104 
Czech Republic 16 13 
Switzerland 52 131 
Chile 42 71 
China 60 147 
Germany 172 255 
Denmark 31 62 
Spain 36 69 
Finland 46 68 
France 178 304 
United Kingdom 565 1,057 
Greece 23 25 
Hong Kong 107 468 
Hungary 12 16 
Indonesia 54 143 
India 11 144 
Ireland 18 30 
Israel 13 43 
Italy 24 102 
Japan 346 1,156 
South Korea 99 333 
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Mexico 7 12 
Malaysia 160 468 
Netherlands 61 70 
Norway 37 61 
New Zealand 12 49 
Pakistan 10 34 
Peru 8 12 
Philippines 31 72 
Poland 16 26 
Portugal 13 19 
Russia 7 16 
Singapore 58 286 
Sweden 56 98 
Thailand 55 225 
Turkey 15 99 
Taiwan 14 304 
United States 1,328 2,700 
South Africa 51 91 
TOTAL 4,060 10,036 
 
 
We use Marshall and Jaggers’ (2003) data, “Polity IV”, to reflect the characteristics 
of the political regimes in the sample countries. These characteristics include the 
general degree of openness or closeness of political institutions, the wedge between 
the degrees of both openness and closeness of these institutions, and the number 
of years that a given regime has persisted since 1872.  
In order to capture the effect of cross-listings on share ownership, we use 
Reese and Weisbach’s (2002) data on the number of non-U.S. companies’ cross-
listings in the U.S. We draw from their data a couple of proxies for the number 
of these cross-listings. The first proxy measures the ratio of the number of a 
sample country’s publicly listed companies that cross-list on the major U.S. 
stock exchanges relative to the total number of the country’s publicly listed 
companies. Similarly, the second proxy measures the ratio of the number of a 
given country’s publicly listed companies that cross-list on either NYSE or 
Nasdaq to the total number of the country’s listed companies.  
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We use La Porta et al.’s (2004) data on legal origin to find whether a given 
country’s legal regime belongs to the British, French, Scandinavian, or German 
family. In addition, we use Acemoglu et al.’s (2001) data on institutional 
endowments to capture differences in the disease and geographic environment. 
The endowment factors include the absolute value of the latitude of a country, 
the presence or absence of tropical climate in a nation, and the receptive-
indirect versus unreceptive-direct nature of colonial transplants.  
We use Esty et al.’s (2005) sustainability indices to reflect several aspects of a 
given country’s level of sustainability. These aspects encompass environmental 
sustainability, ecosystem stress, human sustenance, institutional governance, 
and global stewardship. These indices complement the use of Acemoglu et al.’s 
(2001) proxies for the quality of each sample country’s disease or geographic 
environment.  
Table 3 reports the data variables, descriptions, mathematical notations, and 
sources by category. 
 
Table 3:  Data variables, descriptions, mathematical notations,  
and sources by category 
Variable  Description  Source 
Ownership   
φ0  
φ0 denotes the value of closely held shares 
expressed as an average percentage of the 
value of total common shares outstanding for 
each sample country during 1994-1999. 
Worldscope 
φ(t)  
φ(t) denotes the value of closely held shares 
expressed as an average percentage of total 
common shares outstanding for each sample 
country at the end of 2003. 
Worldscope 
Governance   
Govern  
Govern denotes the arithmetic average of the 
0-100 indicators of a) voice and 
accountability ('Voice'), b) political stability 
and absence of violence ('Politics'), c) 
government effectiveness ('GovtEff'), d) 
regulatory quality ('RegQ'), e) rule of law 
('Law'), and f) control of corruption ('Corru'). 
World Bank; Kaufmann, 
Kraay, and Matruzzi (2003) 
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Voice  
Voice denotes 'Voice and Accountability' as covered 
in the 'Governance Matters III database', including 
such areas as: political process, civil liberties, and 
political rights. 
World Bank; Kaufmann, Kraay, 
and Matruzzi (2003) 
Politics  
Politics denotes 'Political Stability and Absence of 
Violence' as covered in the 'Governance Matters III 
database,' encompassing such areas as: likelihood of 
wrenching changes in government due to 
unconstitutional means, domestic violence, or 
terrorism.  
World Bank; Kaufmann, Kraay, 
and Matruzzi (2003) 
GovtEff  
GovtEff denotes 'Government Effectiveness' as 
covered in the 'Governance Matters III database', 
encompassing such areas as: Quality of public 
service provision and bureaucracy, competency of 
civil servants, credibility of government's policy 
commitments, and independence of civil services 
from political pressures. 
World Bank; Kaufmann, Kraay, 
and Matruzzi (2003) 
RegQ  
RegQ denotes 'Quality of Regulation' as covered in 
the 'Governance Matters III database', 
encompassing such areas as: Incidence of 
market‐unfriendly policies and perceived burdens 
imposed by excessive regulation. 
World Bank; Kaufmann, Kraay, 
and Matruzzi (2003) 
Law  
Law denotes 'Rule of Law' as covered in the 
'Governance Matters III database', encompassing 
such areas as: perceptions of the incidence of crime, 
the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, 
and the enforceability of contracts. 
World Bank; Kaufmann, Kraay, 
and Matruzzi (2003) 
Corru  
Corru denotes 'Control of Corruption' as covered in 
the 'Governance Matters III database', 
encompassing such areas as: perceptions of 
corruption (conventionally defined as the exercise of 
public power for private gain). 
World Bank; Kaufmann, Kraay, 
and Matruzzi (2003) 
Sustainability   
ESI  
ESI denotes the arithmetic average of the following 
five sustainability indicators: a) environmental 
sustainability, b) ecosystem stress, c) human 
sustenance, d) institutional governance, and e) global 
stewardship. 
Yale Center for Environmental 
Law and Policy; Esty, Levy, 
Srebotnjak, and de Sherbinin 
(2005). 
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Environ  
Environ denotes the indicator variable that describes 
the relative degree of air quality, water quantity and 
quality, biodiversity, and terrestrial systems in a 
given country. 
Yale Center for Environmental 
Law and Policy; Esty, Levy, 
Srebotnjak, and de Sherbinin 
(2005). 
Stress  
Stress denotes the indicator variable that describes 
the relative degree of policy remedies for air 
pollution, water stress, ecosystem stress, waste and 
consumption pressures, resource management, and 
population pressure. 
Yale Center for Environmental 
Law and Policy; Esty, Levy, 
Srebotnjak, and de Sherbinin 
(2005). 
Human  
Human denotes the indicator variable that describes 
the relative degree of basic human sustenance and 
environmental health. 
Yale Ctr for Environmental Law 
and Policy; Esty, Levy, 
Srebotnjak, and de Sherbinin 
(2005). 
Institu  
Institu denotes the indicator variable that describes 
the relative degree of advances in science and 
technology, capacity for debate, private sector 
responsiveness, environmental governance, and 
eco‐efficiency. 
Yale Center for Environmental 
Law and Policy; Esty, Levy, 
Srebotnjak, and de Sherbinin 
(2005). 
Globalss  
Globalss denotes the indicator variable that 
describes the relative degree of participation in 
international cooperative efforts and policies 
designed to minimize greenhouse gas emissions 
and transboundary environmental pressures. 
Yale Center for Environmental 
Law and Policy; Esty, Levy, 
Srebotnjak, and de Sherbinin 
(2005). 
Politics     
Polity  
Polity denotes the regime's institutionalized 
authority characteristics (measured as the 
difference between 'Democ' and 'Autoc' (see 
below)). 
Polity IV Project by Marshall 
and Jaggers (2003) 
Persist  
Persist denotes that number of years 
(rounded) that a particular polity case or a 
politically independent regime has persisted 
since 1872. 
Polity IV Project by Marshall 
and Jaggers (2003) 
Democ  
Democ denotes the democracy score as 
covered in the 'Polity IV Project', describing 
the general openness of political institutions. 
Polity IV Project by Marshall 
and Jaggers (2003) 
Autoc  
Autoc denotes the autocracy score as covered 
in the 'Polity IV Project', describing the general 
closeness of political institutions. 
Polity IV Project by Marshall 
and Jaggers (2003) 
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Cross-listings   
CL100  
CL100 denotes the number of non-U.S. firms 
that cross-listed their shares or ADRs on all 
major U.S. stock exchanges (NYSE, Nasdaq, 
OTC and PORTAL) between January 1985 
and June 1999, expressed as a proportion of 
the number of listed companies for a given 
country. 
Reese and Weisbach  
(JFE 2002) 
NNCL100  
NNCL100 denotes the number of non-U.S. 
firms that cross-listed their shares or ADRs on 
NYSE or Nasdaq between January 1985 and 
June 1999, expressed as a proportion of the 
number of listed companies for a given 
country. 
Reese and Weisbach  
(JFE 2002) 
Legal origin   
Engmo  
Engmo denotes the dummy variable that 
carries a value of 1 for a country with the 
British legal origin and 0 otherwise. 
La Porta et al. (2006) 
FRSPmo  
FRSPmo denotes the dummy variable that 
carries a value of 1 for a country with the 
French or Spanish legal origin and 0 
otherwise. 
La Porta et al. (2006) 
Scandmo  
Scandmo denotes the dummy variable that 
carries a value of 1 for a country with the 
Scandinavian legal origin and 0 otherwise. 
La Porta et al. (2006) 
Germmo  
Germmo denotes the dummy variable that 
carries a value of 1 for a country with the 
German legal origin and 0 otherwise. 
La Porta et al. (2006) 
Endowments   
Latitude  
Latitude denotes the absolute value of the 
latitude of a country, as measured by La 
Porta et al.  
Acemoglu et al.  
(AER 2001) 
Tropical  
Tropical denotes the presence or absence 
of tropical climate. This dummy variable 
equals 1 if the country is in a tropical-
climate zone. 
Acemoglu et al. 
 (AER 2001) 
Transplant  
Transplant denotes the sum of indicator-
variables for receptive-indirect transplants, 
unreceptive direct transplants, and 
unreceptive in-direct transplants. 
 Acemoglu et al.  (AER 2001) 
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3.2.  DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Table 4 reports the descriptive statistics and correlations for the above variables. 
The bold figures indicate statistical significance at the 95 percent confidence level. 
At first glance, we note the high correlations among the variables that fall in each 
of these categories (see also the shaded cells). For instance, countries in which 
citizens can readily raise their voice in the political arena (high scores on Voice, 
Politics and Law) seem to have better legal enforcement, quality of regulation, and 
control of corruption (high scores on GovtEff, RegQ, Law and Corru). This 
pattern poses a possible issue of multicollinearity in ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regressions. Multicollinearity occurs whenever two or more explanatory variables 
are highly correlated so that the significance of one or more of these variables 
swamps the significance of other variables. We leave this issue to Section 3.4 in 
which we check the robustness of our OLS regression results. In that section we 
add each set of related explanatory variables one at a time to see if the initial level 
of inside share ownership concentration persists.  
The remaining cells offer some preliminary results. Firstly, the prevailing level 
of share ownership concentration, φ(t), is positively correlated to the initial 
counterpart, φ0. This finding accords with the view that share ownership 
concentration seems to persist (see also Eq.(6)). Secondly, we find that the 
governance indices are all negatively related to the measures of share ownership 
concentration, φ0 and φ(t). This finding is not surprising and echoes the core 
prediction of Eq.(6) and the recent law-and-finance literature (La Porta et al., 1999). 
Thirdly, cross-listing activity is positively correlated to the quality of governance. 
All except one correlation between CL100 and GovtEff are insignificant. In turn, 
we see such positive correlations as indicative of the possibility that more 
facilitative regimes tend to encourage companies to seek capital in the U.S. 
Finally, the rest of Table 4 shows low correlations. These correlations imply that 
the corresponding variables may contain independent and useful information 
about the current level of share ownership concentration φ(t).  
3.3.  REGRESSION RESULTS 
We use the standard convergence tests widely accepted in the literature on 
economic growth (see also the work by Barro (1991), Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(1992), and Sala-i-Martin (1996), among others). These tests help investigate the 
case for conditional β convergence: “…the prediction of the neoclassical 
[growth] model is that the growth rate of an economy will be positively related 
to the distance that separates it from its own steady state” (Sala-i-Martin, 
1996:1027). In the macro-economic context conditional β convergence occurs if 
growth rates are negatively related to initial growth levels after adjusting for 
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institutional factors that define the steady state for each country. We apply the 
test for conditional β convergence to empirically assess the central prediction 
of the model derived in Section 2. Specifically, we run OLS regressions of the 
following first-differences on levels form: 
(9)  ( ) ∑ ε+χβ+lnφβ+β=φtφln ii0φ00  
where φ(t) is the current level of share ownership concentration,  
 φ0  is the initial level of share ownership concentration,  
 χi is the ith control variable, such as governance, cross-listings, legal 
origin, and so forth,  
 β0, βφ, and βi denote the respective coefficients, and 
 ε is the white-noise residual term. 
If the effect of path dependent forces is at best minimal, we expect βφ to be 
close to nil under the null that the initial level of share ownership concentration 
has no implication for the terrain upon which this level of concentration 
persists or shrinks over time. The quantitative results bolster the opposite 
story. In particular, we find that βφ is significantly negative but statistically far 
from –1 in all regressions. Table 5 presents these regression results. In Panel A, 
the first row of each model shows the coefficients and the second row shows 
the corresponding t-statistics. The bold figures indicate significance at the 95 
percent confidence level. Below we discuss each regression in detail.  
3.3.1. Path dependence, legal origin, and asset endowment 
Regressing the log difference between the initial and prevailing levels of share 
ownership concentration on the initial level of share ownership concentration 
yields a significantly negative relation between these variables. We note that βφ is 
not only significantly negative but also far from –1 (t-stat=–4.26). We also note 
that this result is robust to all alternative model specifications below. In addition, 
βφ varies between –0.634 and –0.739. This result suggests that the log distance 
between the initial and prevailing levels of share ownership concentration is likely 
to shrink by 7 percent in response to a 10-percentage increase in the initial level 
of ownership concentration. We note that this result suggests partial convergence 
or the existence of path dependent forces (–1 <βφ<0). 
We then add proxies for legal origin to the regression. None of these dummy 
variables appear to be significant. This result is not consistent with the La Porta 
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et al. studies, which suggest that share ownership tends to be more diffuse in 
common-law regimes than in civil-law regimes. A possible explanation for this 
result is that the predictive power of φ0 overwhelms the effect of factors that 
reflect a given country’s legal tradition.  
Next, we substitute the proxies for legal origin with a set of proxies for the 
wider disease geographic environment: latitude, location in or out of a tropical-
climate zone, and degree of receptive-ness of colonial transplants. The 
regression reports that a country’s location in a tropical-climate zone seems to 
be associated with less diffuse share ownership (t-stat=1.707). This result 
accords with recent studies: the geographic environment shaped the colonizer’s 
settlement strategy and so affected subsequent corporate ownership and 
power-sharing structures. But this association does not affect the explanatory 
power of φ0. In brief, share ownership concentration appears to persist or 
partially shrink even after controlling for the effect of endowment factors.  
3.3.2. Path Dependence, Quality of Governance, and Politics 
We add a number of variables for the quality of governance to the regression. 
Again, βφ continues to be reliably negative (t-stat=–8.954). This result confirms 
the persistence of differences in share ownership concentration. We also find a 
negative association between the log changes in the level of ownership 
concentration and the quality of governance (t-stat=–3.3). This negative 
association accords with the prediction of Eq.(9) and the law-and-finance theme: 
“ownership concentration serves as a substitute for poor investor protection” (La 
Porta et al., 1999:473-474, 497).  
We then replace the proxy for the overall quality of governance with each of its 
constituents and find very similar results. After controlling for the variation in 
the initial level of share ownership concentration, each of these constituents 
(access to political rights, political stability, government effectiveness, quality of 
regulation, rule of law, and control of corruption) has a reliable negative 
association with the log changes in the level of share ownership concentration (t-
stat≈–3). Hence, strong legal enforcement is quite effective in dampening share 
ownership concentration.  
We further study the effect of political orientation on the dispersion of share 
ownership. We find a robust negative link between the log changes in the level 
of share ownership concentration and the number of years since the country’s 
date of official independence (t-stat=–2.718). This result suggests that populist 
politics takes time to develop and further to expand the dispersion of share 
ownership. However, we find no clear link between the relative openness or 
closeness of political institutions and the log changes in the level of ownership 
concentration.  
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3.3.3. Path dependence and functional convergence 
We next explore the effect of cross-listings on U.S. stock exchanges. This 
exploration rests upon the hypothesis that cross-listings on NYSE and Nasdaq 
could induce convergence toward diffuse share ownership by subjecting non-
U.S. listed companies to stringent disclosure, accounting and registration rules. 
These rules raise the costs for non-U.S. companies to uphold the level of share 
ownership concentration. These cross-listed companies may then imitate the 
Berle-Means image. 
Below we report some evidence in support for the case of functional 
convergence. CL100 carries a significantly negative coefficient (t-stat=–2.315). 
Further, NNCL100 has a significantly negative coefficient (t-stat=–2.87). In 
both cases, lnφ0 has a significantly negative effect on the log changes in the 
level of ownership concentration (t-stat≈–8). We note that βφ lands 
comfortably within the range between –1 and 0. In turn, this finding confirms 
partial convergence towards diffuse share ownership or the existence of some 
path dependent forces. Therefore, the path dependence and convergence views 
need not be mutually exclusive. While the path-dependence story portrays the 
static part of the picture, the case for functional convergence better paints the 
more dynamic part. Both stories complement each other in capturing the log 
movements in ownership concentration.  
3.4.  ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
We now run some additional tests to better understand the main determinants 
of the variation in share ownership concentration. Panel B of Table 5 presents 
the results.  
3.4.1. Legal Protection Versus Political Independence  
So far we have found some support for the proxies for quality of governance, 
the effect of cross-listings, and the number of years of political independence. 
We now add variables for legal origin and endowment to check the robustness 
of the results. We report the main results in Panel B of Table 5. When both the 
quality of governance and the number of years of political independence enter 
the regression along with the legal and endowment control factors, we find that 
none of the control variables are significant. The only significant variable is 
lnφ0 (t-stat=–8.882). In fact, these findings could imply certain multicollinearity 
between the legal and political conditions. The legal and political theories of 
corporate finance might have their own merits. It is our conjecture that both 
theories could reinforce each other to some extent.  
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3.4.2. Legal and Endowment Variables Versus NYSE-Nasdaq Cross-Listings 
When we add the percentage of non-U.S. corporations that cross-list on NYSE 
or Nasdaq to the regression along with the legal and endowment control 
factors, we observe that there is a reliable bonding effect of cross-listings (t-
stat=–2.547). We also find support for path dependence as the coefficient on 
lnφ0 falls in the range between –1 and 0 (t-stat=–9.145; –1 < βφ=–0.715 <0). 
Once again, this finding suggests partial convergence to Berle-Means diffuse 
ownership or the existence of path dependence forces on share ownership 
concentration. We note that this result in support of the path dependence view 
persists in the next couple of subsections. We also note that another control 
factor, the presence of a tropical climate, is positively correlated to the 
persistent distance between the initial and prevailing levels of share ownership 
concentration at the 95 percent confidence level (t-stat=1.789). 
We report that cross-listings on NYSE or Nasdaq help dampen share 
ownership concentration in the cross-section of the sample countries (t-stat=–
2.547). Further, βφ=–1.956 suggests that there is likely to be a 2 percentage 
decrease in the log difference between the initial and prevailing levels of 
ownership concentration in response to a 1 percent rise in the proportion of 
non-U.S. listed companies that cross-list on NYSE or Nasdaq. Further, we 
note that this bonding effect of cross-listings on NYSE or Nasdaq is slightly 
stronger than the result in Section 3.3.3 (1.956>1.860).  
3.4.3. Quality of Governance Versus NYSE-Nasdaq Cross-Listings 
We include as explanatory factors the governance metrics, the percentage of 
non-U.S. companies that cross-list on NYSE or Nasdaq, the legal and 
endowment control factors, and the log initial level of share ownership 
concentration. A couple of control variables, lnφ0 and the presence of a tropical 
climate, continue to be significant. Also, the bonding effect of cross-listings 
continues to be strong (t-stat=–2.425). But the quality of governance loses 
explanatory power (t-stat=–0.916). We interpret the above result as indicative 
of a lesser need for corporate law reform. A potential substitute could be 
market mechanisms that facilitate non-U.S. companies both to cross-list and to 
be subject to higher disclosure and listing standards (Goddard, 1996).  
3.4.4. Political Independence Versus NYSE-Nasdaq Cross-Listings 
We now include as explanatory variables the number of years since 
independence, the percentage of non-U.S. firms that cross-list on NYSE or 
Nasdaq, the legal and endowment control variables, and the log initial level of 
share ownership concentration. A couple of control variables, lnφ0 and the 
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presence of a tropical climate, continue to be significant variables. The number 
of years since political independence is statistically significant at the 95 percent 
confidence level. In addition, we continue to observe the bonding effect of 
cross-listings on NYSE or Nasdaq. Hence, the case for functional convergence 
to diffuse share ownership is robust to alternative model specifications. 
3.5.  A BRIEF SUMMARY OF EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Below we summarise the key empirical results: 
▪ Partial convergence toward the Berle-Means view of diffuse share 
ownership concentration prevails in all of the cross-sectional 
regressions. This finding suggests the existence of path dependencies in 
share ownership concentration.  
▪ Cross-listings on NYSE or Nasdaq help facilitate the market 
mechanism for non-U.S. companies to be subject to U.S. rules that 
protect investor rights. Because these disclosure and listing rules impose 
limits on share ownership, convergence towards the Berle-Means form 
of diffuse ownership is possible. We find evidence in support of such 
convergence. 
▪  There is a significantly negative link between the quality of governance 
and the log changes in the level of share ownership concentration. This 
finding accords with the core thesis that investors view control blocks as 
a substitute for poor legal protection. 
4.  CONCLUSIONS 
We engage in the debate over whether corporate ownership concentration 
tends to persist or fall over time. This debate addresses the relevance of policy. 
According to Greenwood (2005), state control and de facto authority could 
swamp the effect of convergence to the Berle-Means image of diffuse 
corporate ownership. In this light, there would be little room for proper 
changes to the law to promote Berle-Means convergence. Convergence (or 
not) would be rather value neutral in a political world.  
We disagree with Greenwood’s view. We argue that even partial convergence 
could help promote welfare. But our current paper does not directly throw 
light on the link between convergence and welfare. A future exploration of the 
complementarities between legal and asset protections could help foster a 
better understanding of the above normative issue.  
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The current paper focuses on the positive issue: is there evidence in support 
of the existing path-dependence or convergence views? In these existing views, 
cross-country differences in corporate ownership concentration might or might 
not shrink. Our model includes the importance of legal and asset-related 
protective arrangements. The core analytical finding is that corporate 
ownership concentration persists or falls depending on the relative importance 
of legal and asset protections. In particular, our model predicts (a) diffuse share 
ownership in nations that impose legal limits on blockholders’ clout to 
expropriate minority shareholder rights, and (b) concentrated ownership in 
nations that rely on asset specificity as a form of investor protection. Our 
model predicts a non-linear negative relationship between the level of share 
ownership concentration and the degree of legal protection. Our central 
prediction echoes La Porta et al.’s (1997) thesis that share ownership 
concentration acts as a substitute for poor investor protection. Also, the 
analytical result presents the prevailing level of ownership concentration as a 
function of both the initial level of ownership concentration and legal and asset 
protections. The implicit relationship between legal protection and subsequent 
ownership concentration is hence causal. We observe that a causal link 
traverses from legal protection to corporate ownership concentration (but not 
vice versa). Specifically, the legal environment helps shape the trajectory upon 
which corporate ownership structures evolve over time. This latter point 
distinguishes our analysis from La Porta et al.’s recent empirical work. An 
additional note on asset specificity is that there is a nebulous non-linear relation 
between asset protection and corporate ownership concentration. 
Our empirical work suggests partial convergence toward Berle-Means diffuse 
share ownership. It is thereby reasonable to infer the existence of path 
dependent forces on ownership concentration. But this result does not 
preclude the possibility of functional convergence or convergence to the 
diffuse form of share ownership through cross-listings on the U.S. stock 
exchanges that impose stringent disclosure and listing requirements. In essence, 
these findings support a case for the co-existence of the preexisting path-
dependency and functional-convergence stories.  
Finally, the determinants of persistence of share ownership concentration 
found in our empirical work should provoke future research that focuses on 
how these determinants could help enhance welfare. This research in turn 
throws light on how to ‘race to the top’ in setting a legal framework to capture 
the positive outcomes of Berle-Means convergence.  
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